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Abstract. At times, human behavior seems erratic and irrational. Therefore, when
modeling human decision-making, it seems reasonable to take the remarkable
abilities of humans into account with respect to rational behavior, but also their
apparent deviations from the normative standards of rationality shining up in cer-
tain rationality tasks. Based on well-known challenges for human rationality, to-
gether with results from psychological studies on decision-making and from pre-
vious work in the field of computational modeling of analogy-making, I argue
that the analysis and modeling of rational belief and behavior should also con-
sider context-related cognitive mechanisms like analogy-making and coherence
maximization of the background theory. Subsequently, I conceptually outline a
high-level algorithmic approach for a Heuristic Driven Theory Projection-based
system for simulating context-dependent human-style rational behavior. Finally,
I show and elaborate on the close connections, but also on the significant differ-
ences, of this approach to notions of “ecological rationality”.
1 Introduction
At times, human behavior seems erratic and irrational. Still, it is widely undoubted
that humans can act rational and, in fact, appear to act rational most of the time. In
explaining behavior, we use terms like beliefs and desires. If an agent’s behavior makes
sense to us, then we interpret it as a reasonable way to achieve the agent’s goals given
his beliefs. I take this as indication that some concept of rationality does play a crucial
role when describing and explaining human behavior in a large variety of situations.
Based on ideas from vernacular psychology, in many cases rational beliefs are inter-
preted as a foundation of rational behavior. Therefore, in what follows, I will mostly be
concerned with beliefs and knowledge, i.e. the epistemic aspects of rationality. Combin-
ing and further developing work separately presented in [1, 2], I want to shed light on
some aspects of situated rationality (i.e., rationality and rational behavior as it happens
in given situations and contexts, as opposed to purely theoretical and abstract notions
of rationality) from a mostly computational cognitive science point of view. Although,
even in psychology or economics there is no generally accepted formal framework for
rationality, I will argue for a model that links rationality to the ability of humans to
establish analogical relations based on contextual and situational clues. This is an at-
tempt for further developing a non-classical perspective and framework for rationality
implementing principles of the “subject-centered rationality” meta-framework [3]. Fur-
thermore, in the course of a mostly overview-like presentation, I want to give some hints
at how already existing frameworks for computational analogy-making integrate some
aspects considered characteristic for human decision making, and how the proposed
view connects to the better known high-level framework of “ecological rationality” [4].
2 Rationality Concepts and Challenges
2.1 Rationality
Many quite distinct frameworks for modeling rationality have been proposed, and an
attempt at clustering these frameworks to the best of our knowledge results in at least
four classes: logic-based models (cf. e.g. [5]), probability-based models (cf. e.g. [6]),
heuristic-based models (cf. e.g. [7]), and game-theoretically based models (cf. e.g. [8]).
Several of these models have been considered for establishing a normative theory
of rationality, not only trying to model “rational behavior”, but also to offer predictive
power for determining whether a certain belief, action, or behavior may be considered
rational or not. Also, every of these theories specifies some sort of definition of ra-
tionality. Unfortunately, when comparing the distinct frameworks, it shows that these
definitions are in many cases almost orthogonal to each other (as are the frameworks).
Therefore, in this paper, I will propose certain cognitive mechanisms for explaining and
specifying rationality in an integrated, more homogeneous way.
2.2 Well-Known Challenges
Although the aforementioned frameworks have gained merit in modeling certain as-
pects of human intelligence, the generality of each such class of frameworks has at the
same time been challenged by psychological experiments. For example, as described in
detail below, in the famous Wason-selection task [9] human subjects fail at a seemingly
simple logical task (cf. Table 1). Also, experiments by Byrne on human reasoning with
conditionals [10] indicated severe deviations from classical logic (cf. Table 1). Simi-
larly, Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda problem [11] illustrates a striking violation of the
rules of probability theory (cf. Table 1). Heuristic approaches to judgment and reason-
ing [12] are often seen as approximations to a rational ideal and in some cases could
work in practice, but often lack formal transparency and explanatory power. Game-
based frameworks are questioned due to the lack of a unique concept of optimality in
game-theory that can support different “rational behaviors” for one and the same situa-
tions (e.g. Pareto optimality vs. Nash equilibrium vs. Hick’s optimality etc., [13]).
Wason Selection Task: This task shows that a large majority of subjects are seem-
ingly unable to verify or to falsify a simple logical implication: “If on one side of the
card there is a D, then on the other there is the number 3”. In order to check this rule,
subjects need to turn D and 7, i.e. subjects need to check the direct rule application
and the contrapositive implication. After a slight modification of the content of the rule
(content-change), while keeping the structure of the problem isomorphic, subjects per-
form significantly better: In [14], the authors show that a change of the abstract rule
“p → q” to a problem accommodated in a more natural and familiar context than the
mere card checking setup significantly increases correct answers of subjects. The au-
thors use the rule “If a person is drinking beer, then he must be over 20 years old.” The
cards used in the task were “drinking beer”, “drinking coke”, “25 years old”, and “16
years old”. Solving this task according to the rules of classical logic comes down to
turning “drinking beer” and “16 years old”.
Wason-Selection Task [15]:
Subjects are given the rule “Every card which has a D on one side has a 3 on the other
side.” and are told that each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other side.
Then they are presented with four cards showing respectively D, K, 3, 7, and asked to
turn the minimal number of cards to determine the truth of the sentence.
Inferences and Conditionals [10]:
1. If Marian has an essay to write, she will study late in the library. She does not have
an essay to write.
2. If Marian has an essay to write, she will study late in the library. She has an essay to
write.
3. If Marian has an essay to write, she will study late in the library. She has an essay to
write. If the library stays open, she will study late in the library.
Linda-Problem [11]:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy.
As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice,
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Linda is a teacher in elementary school.
Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes.
Linda is active in the feminist movement. (F)
Linda is a psychiatric social worker.
Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters.
Linda is a bank teller. (T)
Linda is an insurance salesperson.
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. (T&F)
Table 1. The Wason-selection task questions whether humans reason in such situations according
to the laws of classical logic. Byrne’s experiments on how humans handle conditionals also shed
doubt on a logic-based model. Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda problem questions the ability of
humans to reason according to the laws of probability theory.
Inferences and Conditionals: Also Byrne’s observations question whether human
reasoning can be covered by a classical logic-based framework. Presented with the in-
formation given in Table 1, from 1. 46% of subjects conclude that Marian will not study
late in the library, erring with respect to classical logic (as denial of the antecedent does
not validate a negation of the consequent). Also, from 2. 96% of subjects conclude that
Marian will study late in the library, whilst only 38% of subjects reach the same con-
clusion from 3. Thus an introduction of another antecedent (without any indication that
the antecedent should not hold) dramatically reduced the number of subjects applying
a simple modus ponens in their process of forming a conclusion.
Linda Problem: With respect to the Linda problem it seems to be the case that
subjects are amenable to the so-called conjunction fallacy: subjects are told a story
specifying a particular profile about the bank teller Linda. Then, eight statements about
Linda are shown and subjects are asked to order them according to their probability (cf.
Table 1). 85% of subjects decide to rank the eighth statements “Linda is a bank teller
and active in the feminist movement” (T & F) as more probable than the sixth statement
“Linda is a bank teller” (T). This ranking contradicts basic laws of probability theory,
as the joint probability of two events (T & F) is less or at most equal to the probability
of each individual event.
Classical Resolution Strategies: Strategies that have been proposed to address the
mentioned challenges include non-classical logics for modeling subjects’ behavior in
the Wason-Selection task [16], or a switch from (syntactic) deductions to reasoning in
semantic models [17]. Still, these are only individual case-based solutions, which do
not (or only hardly) generalize, and thus do not provide a basis for a unified theory or
the genesis of a generally accepted broad concept of rationality.
3 Non-Standard Interpretations of Challenges for Rationality
An immediate reaction to the challenges for rationality depicted above may be to deny
that humans are always able to correctly reason according to the laws of classical logic
or the laws of probability theory. Still, concluding that human behavior therefore is ir-
rational in general does not seem convincing. The most that can be concluded from the
experiments is that human agents are neither deduction machines nor probability esti-
mators, but perform their indisputable reasoning capabilities with other means. From
our point of view, subjects’ behavior in the described tasks is connected to certain
situation-sensitive cognitive mechanisms that are used by humans in such reasoning
tasks, giving rise to the emergence of behavior commonly described as rational.
3.1 Interlude: Analogy and Analogical Reasoning
Analogy-making refers to the human ability of perceiving dissimilar domains as similar
with respect to certain aspects based on shared commonalities in relational structure or
appearance. Analogy and analogy-making research has received growing attention dur-
ing the last decades, changing the perception of analogy from interpreting it as a special
and rarely applied case of reasoning to placing it in the center of human cognition it-
self [18]. The literature on analogies knows a distinction between two subcategories
of analogical mapping: attribute mappings (surface mappings) and relational mappings
[19]. Whilst both mapping types are standardly assumed to be one-to-one, attribute
mappings are based on attributes or surface properties, such as shape or color (i.e., two
objects can be said to be similar with respect to a particular attribute or set of attributes),
whilst relational mappings are based on relations between objects, such as having the
same role or the same effect (i.e., two objects can then be said to be similar with re-
spect to some relation to one or more other objects). Once such an analogical bridge
has been established between two domains, analogical reasoning now allows for car-
rying over inferences from the base to the target domain in order to extend knowledge
about the latter, i.e., an inference which holds between elements in the base domain is
also assumed to analogically hold between the corresponding elements of the target do-
main. Formalizing different situations and accompanying contexts in a natural way as
distinct domains, analogical reasoning thus offers a by now well-developed framework
for modeling cross-situational and cross-contextual reasoning processes.
3.2 How Analogy-Making Enters the Rational Picture
In a short reply to Colman’s article “Cooperation, psychological game theory, and lim-
itations of rationality in social interaction” [20], Kokinov challenges traditional views
on rationality [21]. Taking an initial stance similar to Colman’s, agreeing on that ratio-
nality fails as both, descriptive theory of human-decision making and normative theory
for good decision-making, Kokinov reaches a different, more radical conclusion than
Colman did before. Instead of trying to fix the concept of rationality by redefining it,
adding formerly unconsidered criteria for optimization of some kind, he proposes to re-
place the concept of rationality as a theory in its own right by a multilevel theory based
on cognitive processes involved in decision-making. Where Colman proposes a collec-
tion of ad-hoc strategies for explaining the deviations from rationality which people
exhibit in their behavior, Kokinov proposes analogy as means of unifying the differ-
ent, formerly unconnected parts of Colman’s attempt at describing the mechanisms of
decision-making. In Kokinov’s view, the classical concept of utility making has to be
rendered as an emergent property, which will emerge in most, but not all, cases, con-
verting rationality itself in an emergent phenomenon, assigning rational rules the status
of approximate explanations of human behavior.
Also psychological studies on decision-making and choice processes provide evi-
dence for a crucial role of analogy. An overview by Markman and Moreau [22], based
on experiments and observations from psychological studies, amongst others on con-
sumer behavior and political decision-making, reaches the conclusion that there are at
least two central ways how analogy-making influences choice processes. Analogies to
other domains can provide means of representation for a choice situation, as generally
speaking the making of a decision relies on a certain degree of familiarity with the
choice setting. In many cases of this kind, analogy plays a crucial role in structuring the
representation of the choice situation, and thus may strongly influence the outcome of
a decision. Also, structural alignment (a key process of analogy-making) plays a role
when comparing the different possible options offered by a decision situation, with new
options being learned by comparison to already known ones. An experimental study
by Kokinov [23] demonstrated that people use analogies in the process of decision-
making, with significant benefit already if only one case is found to be analogous to the
choice situation under consideration. Furthermore, evidence has been found that there
is no significant difference between close and remote analogies in this process, and that
people are not limited to relying only on analogous cases from their own experience,
but that also cases which were only witnessed passively (e.g., by being a bystander, or
learning about a situation from reports in the media) may have beneficial influence.
Taking all this together, I strongly argue in favor of taking into account cognitive
mechanisms centered around the concept of analogy and their situation- and context-
dependent nature when analyzing and modeling rational belief and behavior in humans.
In the following, I want to provide an analogy-inspired point of view on the aforemen-
tioned well-known challenges for rationality.
3.3 The Wason-Selection Task and Cognitive Mechanisms
As mentioned above, according to [14] subjects perform better (in the sense of more
according to the laws of classical logic) in the Wason-Selection task, if content-change
to a more natural situational framing makes the task easier to access for subjects. In our
reading, subjects’ performance is tightly connected to establishing appropriate analo-
gies. Subjects perform badly in the classical version of the Wason-Selection task, simply
because they fail to establish a fitting analogy with an already known situation. In the
“beer drinking” version mentioned above, i.e. the re-contextualized version of the task,
the situation changes substantially, because subjects can do what they would do in an
everyday analogous situation: they need to check whether someone younger than 20
years is drinking beer in a bar. This is to check the age of someone who is drinking beer
and conversely to check someone who is younger that 20 years whether he is drinking
beer or not. In short, the success or failure of managing the task is crucially dependent
on the possibility to establish a meaningful analogy, which in turn intrinsically is tightly
linked to the provided situational and contextual clues.
3.4 The Inferences and Conditionals Problem and Cognitive Mechanisms
The results concerning conclusions drawn by the subjects in Byrne’s experiments can
also be explained through analogy-making and context dependence. People faced with
the information given in 1. will recall similar conversations they had before, using these
known situations as basis for their decision on what to conclude. According to Grice
[24], in conversations speakers are supposed to provide the hearer with as much infor-
mation as is needed for exchanging the necessary information, a rule which goes in
accordance with our everyday observation. Thus, when being given the additional in-
formation that “Marian does not have to write an essay.”, the set of candidate situations
for establishing an analogy is re-oriented towards situations in which this information
had an impact on the outcome, resulting in the conclusion that Marian would not study
late in the library either. Regarding 2. and 3., a similar conjecture seems likely to hold:
By additionally mentioning the library, similar situations in which the library might ac-
tually have played a crucial role (e.g., by being closed) will be taken into account as
possible base domains of the analogy, causing the change in conclusions made.
3.5 The Linda Problem and Cognitive Mechanisms
For Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda problem, a natural explanation of subjects’ be-
havior is that people find a lower degree of coherence between Linda’s profile (i.e.,
the context) and the statement “Linda is a bank teller”, than they do with the expanded
“Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement”. In the latter case, at least
one conjunct of the statement fits quite well to Linda’s profile. In short, subjects prefer
situations that seem to have a stronger inner coherence. Coherence is important for the
successful establishment of an analogical relation, as it facilitates the finding of a source
domain for an analogy. I conjecture that in order to make sense of the task, humans rate
statements with a higher probability where facts are arranged in a contextual theory with
a higher degree of coherence. Now, seeing coherence as a means for facilitating situ-
ated analogy-making, and taking into account that analogy has been identified as a core
element of human cognition, the decision for the coherence-maximizing option is not
surprising anymore, but fits neatly into the contextualized analogy-based framework,
and can, thus, also be predicted (providing inductive support for our general claim).1
4 Rationality, Decision-Making and Analogy-Making Systems
In the following I want to give an overview-like sketch of how computational analogy-
making systems can be related to some of the discussed challenges for rationality, as
well as to context-sensitive decision-making and choice in general, demonstrating their
value as models also in this domain. This prepares the ground for the presentation of a
high-level algorithmic approach to simulating context-dependent human-style rational
behavior (based on the Heuristic-Driven Theory Projection framework for computa-
tional analogy-making) in the following section.
4.1 Heuristic-Driven Theory Projection
Heuristic-Driven Theory Projection (HDTP) is a symbolic framework for computing
analogical relations between two domains (formalizing different situations or contexts)
that are axiomatized in a many-sorted first order logic language [25]. HDTP, after being
given the logic representations of the two domains, by means of anti-unification [26]
computes a common generalization of both, and uses this resulting theory as basis for
establishing an analogy, also involving analogical transfer of knowledge between the
domains (i.e., the system provides an explicit generalization of the two domains as a
by-product of the analogy-making process). Thus, conceptually, HDTP proceeds in two
phases: in the mapping phase, the formal representations of source and target domain
are compared to find structural commonalities, and a generalized description is created,
which subsumes the matching parts of both domains. In the transfer phase, unmatched
knowledge in the source domain can be transferred to the target domain to establish
new hypotheses in an analogical way (cf. Fig. 1).
As an example for cross-contextual reasoning in HDTP think about the Rutherford-
Bohr planetary model of the atom in analogy to a model of the solar system: HDTP,
after finding commonalities in the logical representation of the solar system as base
domain, and the atom model as target domain (for example, that in both cases less
massive objects are somehow related to a more massive central object, or that always
a positive distance and a positive force between these lighter objects and the heavier
core can be found), a generalization is computed, via which known laws from the base
can be re-instantiated in the target (e.g., that a lighter object revolves around a heavier
1 Tversky and Kahneman [11] proposed the representativeness heuristic for explaining their
findings, hypothesizing for the probability of an event to be evaluated by the degree to which
the event is representative of a corresponding mental model. Although this notion superficially
seems almost identical to a coherence-based account certain distinctions have to be noted,
most prominently a difference in basic perspective: Whilst representativeness takes into ac-
count, e.g., notions of typicality, similarity in essential characteristics, but also puts significant
emphasis on different degrees of salience between elements, coherence targets a maximiza-
tion of achieved homogeneity and seamless integration (at first leaving levels of salience and
similar aspects out of consideration).
Generalization
xx &&
Source
analogical transfer // Target
Fig. 1. HDTP’s overall approach to creating analogies
one when there is negative centrifugal force between the lighter and the heavier one,
yielding the revolution of the electrons around the nucleus, or that the centrifugal force
between two spatially separated objects with positive gravitational force between both
is equal to the negative value of that gravity, resulting in stable orbits of the electrons in
the model).
HDTP implements a principle (by using heuristics) that maximizes the coverage of
the involved domains [25]. Intuitively, this means that the sub-theory of the source (or
the target) that can be generated by re-instantiating the generalization is maximized.
Putting it the other way round, the original domain-specific information and structure
shall implicitly be preserved as far as possible. The higher the coverage the better, be-
cause more support for the analogy is provided by the generalization (in a way, the
higher the achieved degree of coverage, the more firmly the analogy is rooted in the
underlying domains, used for creating the generalization). A further heuristic in HDTP
is the minimization of substitution lengths in the analogical relation, i.e. the simpler the
analogy the better [27]. The motivation for this heuristic is to prevent arbitrary associa-
tions. Clearly there is a trade-off between high coverage and simplicity of substitutions:
An appropriate analogy should intuitively be as simple as possible, but also as general
and broad as necessary in order to be non-trivial. Unfortunately, high coverage normally
comes with higher complexity of substitutions (as a more complex generalization allows
for a higher degree of re-representation of domain-specific structures and information),
whilst the simplicity constraint is trying to steer the analogy-making process in exactly
the opposite direction. This kind of trade-off is similar to the kind of trade-off that is
usually the topic of model selection in machine learning and statistics.
4.2 The Wason-Selection Task Revisited
A modeling of the Wason-Selection task with HDTP is quite simple as long as appro-
priate background knowledge is available, in case an analogy should be established,
or the lack of appropriate background knowledge prevents analogy-making, in case no
analogy should be established: On the one hand, if background knowledge for an anal-
ogous case is missing (i.e., in the case of HDTP, no domain representation which offers
sufficient commonalities to the target domain as to serve as a base for the analogy pro-
cess can be retrieved from memory), then there is no chance to establish an analogical
relation. Hence, subjects have to apply other auxiliary strategies, possibly deviating
from the expected “right” answer. If there is a source theory with sufficient structural
commonalities on the other hand, then the establishment of an analogical relation is
straightforward, resulting in a smooth solution process of the task.
4.3 Analogy in Choice
Coming back to Markman and Moreau’s meta-study of the role analogy and analogical
comparison play in the process of human choice, presented in [22], I want to show some
connections of their findings to computational systems for analogy-making.
It is without doubt that the choice of options taken into account when making a de-
cision is of crucial importance for the entire process of decision-making. Markman and
Moreau present the formation of consideration sets (i.e., the set of options taken into
account by a decision maker) as one of the places at which the influence of analogy on
decision-making clearly shines up. An analogical reasoning process is involved when
deciding on which scenarios are likely to happen, and thus have to be considered (also
see [28] for related results). According to their findings, there are different factors influ-
encing which analogies will be used in a choice situation, resulting in a set of analogies
which are considered similar or familiar to the current situation. Close analogs have the
advantage of probably allowing the transfer of more lower-order relations than distant
analogs would, i.e., closer concepts are more likely to be considered as an option due to
an easier and more fruitful analogy-making process. This goes in accordance with char-
acteristics exhibited by many computational models of analogy-making, where again
I want to use HDTP as prototypical example: As pointed out in [25], although HDTP
basically aligns any entity, function or predicate, it clearly prefers literally-matching
alignments over non-literally ones, and equivalent structures to structural mismatches,
thus reconstructing a preference and behavior also shown by humans.
Also, experiments indicate that commonly shared surface elements of domains are
more useful as retrieval cues than are connected relational systems. Also this carries
over to the principles underlying HDTP, with the system trying to minimize the com-
plexity of analogical relations whilst maximizing the degree of coverage: Connected re-
lational systems have the strong tendency of reaching higher-order stages, whilst direct
surface correspondences stay on a low level, allowing for a direct matching of features.
Thus, handling common surface elements allows for a certain degree of coverage with-
out having to escalate complexity, probably also making HDTP prefer surface elements
for supporting an analogy over relational ones (if both types are equally available).
Finally, it shows that elements related to a person’s individual history of experiences
influence the way decisions are taken. These elements have the advantage of being
(mostly) highly accessible, with base domains which form part of someone’s past being
more likely to have richly connected relational structures, providing good ground for
eventual analogical inference. When searching for a way of computationally modeling
this phenomenon, it comes to mind that a similar effect can already be found in AMBR,
Kokinov’s hybrid analogy-making system [29]. This system exhibits signs of priming
effects in the retrieval process of a fitting base domain for an analogy’s given target
domain, together with a general influence of earlier memory states on later ones.
5 Cornerstones of an Architecture for Human-Style Rationality
In this section, I outline how solving a rationality puzzle can mechanistically be mod-
eled in terms of HDTP, by this also pointing towards principles for a HDTP-based
architecture for a cognitive rationality system. The described model naturally connects
to previous foundational work in the field of decision theory and economics. Almost
two decades ago, [30] developed an (at least partly) case-based theory and model for
decision-making under uncertainty. In their model, cases are primitive and provide a
simple axiomatization of a decision rule that selects an act to be performed based on
the act’s past performance in similar cases. Each act is evaluated by the sum of the utility
levels that resulted from using this act in past cases, where the degree of (dis)similarity
between the past cases and the problem at hand is accounted for by weighting the re-
spective utility by the value of a similarity measure between both situations. Remark-
ably, this formal approach in a natural way gives rise to (amongst others) the notions of
satisficing decisions and aspiration levels (cf. [31] for a detailed account).
The subsequently proposed general architecture, on a very abstract level, can func-
tionally be subdivided into four steps (adding a framing pre- and post-processing step
to the original HDTP setting described above): Given a problem description and do-
main, select and retrieve analogical situations (and embedding contexts) from memory
(retrieval). Use the problem as target domain for an analogy, the retrieved situation as
source domain, and establish an analogy between both (mapping). Transfer solution-
relevant knowledge from the source domain to the target domain via the analogical
mapping (transfer). Apply the newly obtained knowledge in the target domain (i.e. the
problem domain) for solving the problem (application).
As already stated before, in HDTP, source and target domains for analogy-making
are represented as theories in a many-sorted first-order logical language. In the follow-
ing, I additionally assume that the system has access to a library of previously formal-
ized situations and scenes (i.e., domains that had already initially been pre-compiled, or
that have been learned and acquired during runtime up to the present moment in time),
corresponding to a human’s (episodic) memory of previously seen and experienced
happenings and events (here, constraints on human memory could e.g. be modeled by
limiting the number of domains available to the system).
Given the (rationality) problem at hand as target domain for the analogy, the re-
trieval problem within HDTP comes down to selecting a fitting domain from memory
as source domain. This can be done in different ways, for example by means of a sep-
arate module (similar to the MAC stage in the MAC/FAC analogy model [32]), or by
forcing HDTP to construct analogies between all possible pairings of the target do-
main with a candidate source domain, subsequently taking the heuristic value HDTP
computed when constructing the analogy as a measure for analogical distance between
domains and proceeding e.g. with the analogically closest domain as source domain for
the analogy. By now additionally assuming that candidate source domains had been la-
beled with overall satisfaction levels, a mechanism similar in output to the utility-based
approach of [30] arises: Weighted by the respective analogical distance, the satisfac-
tion level can serve as parameter for the domain selection. Also, the outcome of the
retrieval process of course does not have to be unique, and always strongly depends
on the heuristics or distance measures used, thereby introducing a degree of uncertainty
into the system (matching the uncertainty and irregularities in human rational behavior).
Once a source and target domain have been identified, HDTP constructs an ana-
logical relation between both, mapping between elements from source and target do-
main. The construction of this mapping is based on the previously outlined general-
ization mechanism, guided by a heuristic which tries to keep the analogy as simple
(i.e. less general) as possible, whilst still maximizing the sub-theories of the sources
which can be re-instantiated from the generalization (a trade off close in spirit to the
precision/recall problem in pattern recognition and information retrieval). Also here, in
most cases the mappings between elements of the respective domains do not have to be
unique (e.g. different elements of the source could be mapped to one certain element of
the target domain), again introducing a source of uncertainty.
In the transfer phase, knowledge from the (with respect to problem solutions richer)
source domain is transferred to the target domain (i.e. the problem at hand). Making use
of the mappings established in the previous step, the concepts from the source domain
are re-instantiated from the generalized theory into the target domain, enriching the
latter and giving additional information needed for computing a solution to the problem.
In the last step, the newly added knowledge is applied in the target domain (e.g.
used for reasoning and inference), in most cases yielding a solution to the problem
(sometimes, although additional knowledge has been provided via the analogical pro-
cess, the problem solving process still will fail, a phenomenon reminiscent of human
failure in seemingly familiar, in the past already mastered problem situations). This
step also includes a consolidation process, integrating the transferred knowledge into
the target domain, giving an expanded or richer domain.
Of course, this type of architecture leaves ample space for uncertainty and deviating
behavior: Apart of the already mentioned systemic influences, a certain chance of devi-
ation from HDTP’s predicted outcome for a certain problem situation is automatically
introduced by the use of logical theories as descriptive framework for contexts, situa-
tions and problems. As with every symbolic formalization, decisive information might
accidentally be left out of considerations when formulating the domain descriptions.
Nonetheless, I do not see this as a major drawback, but rather as a natural constraint
every system trying to predict a phenomenon as complex as human rational behavior
has to face, and which even holds in the case where humans try to predict each other.
6 On the Relation of Analogical and Ecological Rationality
Over the last years, “ecological rationality” [4] has become one of the most prominent
new, non-classical notions of rationality. Within this framework, human reasoning and
behavior are considered rational if they are adapted to the environment in which humans
act: One cannot understand human cognition by studying either the environment or
cognition alone, and peoples reasoning has to be seen as the result of an adaptation of
the individual to his or her environment.
This approach at first glance seems almost identical to the contextualized analogy
approach presented in this paper. But, although there indeed are close conceptual ties
and many underlying intuitions and first assumptions are shared, there still are sig-
nificant differences. The insight that in order to understand cognition one also needs
to explore the characteristics of the environment upon which cognition is based and
within which it is happening is common to both views, but the conclusions drawn from
this observation differ in their focus: Ecological rationality on the one hand mostly em-
phasizes the impact the environment has on the reasoner and the reasoning process in
that, e.g., reasoning mechanisms have to be adaptive to the environment and that the en-
vironment imposes certain ways of reasoning on the reasoner via resource constraints
and efficiency optimization. The contextualized analogy approach on the other hand is
based on a certain type of mechanism which is assumed to play a crucial role in the
reasoner’s cognitive setup in the first place, independent of the particular environment.
Clearly, at the moment of reasoning the situation and the context the reasoner currently
is situated in play an important and fundamental role in providing additional clues and,
thus, allowing for efficient and resource adequate reasoning. Nonetheless, the perspec-
tive stays subject-centered in that the reasoner and his or her cognitive capacities are the
determining elements (placing it under the conceptual umbrella of “subject-centered ra-
tionality” [3]). Under the advocated paradigm, given an environment, it is not said that
the reasoner would always (almost automatically) prefer a theoretically more efficient
reasoning mechanism (as it would be the case under the ecological rationality assump-
tion). Instead, properties and preferences specific to the situationally and contexutally
situated subject have to be taken into account — where a strong bias towards analogy
as core cognitive capacity is assumed.
7 Concluding Remarks
The evidence for a crucial role of analogy-making and context-sensitive forms of rea-
soning presented over the last pages falls far from being complete. Yet another example
can be given in form of well-known studies on human decision-making under time
pressure, which show a change in the applied inference procedure. In [33], the authors
report that, whilst the best predicting model of human inference for decision making in
an unstressed conditions was a weighted linear model integrating all available informa-
tion, when time pressure was induced, best predictions were obtained by using a simple
lexicographic heuristic [34]. This presumed change from a more complex strategy us-
ing complex relational structures to a simple single-attribute-based procedure also can
be found in research on analogy-making: In [35], it is reported that anxiety made par-
ticipants of an analogical-reasoning experiment switch from a preference for complex
relational mappings to simple attribute-based mappings. Still, whilst not claiming com-
pleteness of the given overview of evidence, I am convinced that the examples and
indications are sufficient as not to allow for leaving analogy and cognitive processes
out of consideration.
A criticism with respect to the analogy-making approach might be a seeming lack
of normativity as a theory. Although work on this topic is still in a very early stage, I am
confident that this objection is partially conceptually mistaken and partially grasps at
nothing: First of all it has to be noticed that the presented ideas clearly aim at a positive
theory and predictive notion of situated rationality rather than at an a priori norma-
tive conception (also see [3] for further details). Secondly, normativity can a posteriori
be introduced in several different ways on distinct levels, for instance in a subject-
independent fashion by considering the reasonableness (or unreasonableness) of made
analogies. Roughly speaking, it is obvious that different analogies may have different
degrees of reasonableness, e.g., based on the level to which they result in coherent be-
liefs and to which they encompass both, the source and the target domain of the analogy
(again see [3] for a sketch of an alternate, subject-centered proposal).
In this paper, I argued in favor of the concept of analogy and for a strengthened
awareness for the importance of situation dependence and context effects in concep-
tual research on rationality and decision-making on a foundational level. Based on a
review of some basic concepts and existing work within the fields of analogy research
and research on decision-making and choice, together with an exemplifying proposal
of new resolution strategies for classical rationality puzzles and a high-level conceptual
sketch of an algorithmic approach for an analogy-based computational model, I advo-
cated that the usage of frameworks for establishing analogical relations and the usage
of frameworks that can maximize the situational and contextual coherence of a theory
necessarily have to be taken into account when modeling (and possibly implementing)
what is commonly considered rational belief in a not overly simplified manner.
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